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Public Access to Information in Civil
Litigation vs. Litigant's Demand for
Privacy: Is the "Vanishing Trial" an
Avoidable Consequence?
Dennis J. Drasco*
Recently, the legal and academic communities have been studying the phe-
nomenon of the "vanishing trial."1 The phenomenon is an observation of the fact
that the American court system is experiencing a trend of shrinking trial dockets.
At least one scholar has partially attributed the decline in trials to the value placed
upon settlement rather than adjudication within our justice system. 2 Those com-
peting values have spawned a debate regarding the secrecy and confidentiality
characteristic of settlements versus public access to information in civil litigation.
3
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have noted the complexities involved in
regard to the factors to be considered.4  This article outlines those factors, ad-
dresses the impact electronic filing may have on them, and theorizes that the im-
pact may further contribute to the phenomenon of the vanishing trial, and what
can be done to avoid those circumstances.
I. THE "VANISHING TRIAL" PHENOMENON
Marc Galanter is credited with coining the phrase "vanishing trial" and with
significantly contributing to the understanding of the phenomenon by being a
pioneer in the collection of data pertaining to trials. For purposes of this article, it
is important to note that Galanter's data reveals that as of 2002 dispositions by
trial had declined to 1.8 percent, compared to 11.5 percent in 1962. 5 Scholars
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Section of Litigation and Vice President of the Association of the Federal Bar of New Jersey. Dennis
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1. For a discussion on recent studies see Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should
Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DiSp. RESOL. 35
2. Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283,288-92 (1999).
3. Id. at 289-300.
4. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); U.S. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252 (6th
Cir. 1991); Pansy v. Borough of Strousburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273
F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability
Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 775-85 (1990) (examining the federal
court's development of a balancing test).
5. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,461 (2004).
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have suggested that the phenomenon may be the result of procedural reform and
the acknowledgment that the trial process is expensive and time consuming.6
Those scholars have noted that many commentators view trials as a failure result-
ing in a victor "at great cost to both sides and the public."7
The idea of trials being "wasteful" may have resulted in a preference for set-
tlement, which procedural rules tend to foster. 8 As noted by Professor Laurie
Kratky Dore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 acknowledges that settlement is
an objective of pretrial conferences and that trial courts are permitted to convene
settlement conferences as early as possible within the litigation process.9 Liberal
procedural rules pertaining to discovery, however, also help to explain the decline
of trials.' ° Indeed, discovery accelerates the disclosure of information which in
turn permits counsel to regularly reevaluate their positions. In reevaluating their
positions, counsel and their clients are forced to address the cost of litigation com-
pared to the advantages of settlement." This cost-effect analysis is consistent
with our market economy and the primary objective of our civil justice system:
"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."l1
Another consequence contributing to the "vanishing trial" phenomenon, is the
migration of cases to other venues, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
which methods include arbitration and mediation. Galanter has suggested that
ADR is "one of the most prominent explanations" for the decline of trials. 1" Gal-
anter admits that it is still unknown how much an effect ADR has on trials, but
notes that research reveals that in 2001 approximately one-seventh of all federal
cases were referred to some form of ADR.' 4 That number does not account for
those cases that were not filed with the courts. Moreover, mandatory ADR is
becoming more common in areas such as employment, financial services, and
health care.' 5 Although it is unknown how many cases are diverted by mandatory
ADR, the annual reports of the American Arbitration Association suggest that the
number has reached the hundreds of thousands.' 6
To the extent that the procedural rules, economic factors, and/or a combina-
tion of the two have contributed to the "vanishing trial" phenomenon and the pref-
erence for ADR and settlement, the existence of those factors, the phenomenon,
and such a preference clearly threatens the benefits associated with trials. The
6. Dore, supra note 2, at 290-92; see generally, Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For,
Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, I J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 943 (2004).
7. Yeazell, supra note 6, at 947.
8. Dore, supra note 2, at 290-92.
9. Id.
10. Yeazell, supra note 6, at 950-54.
11. Id.; see Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34 ("Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of
assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes.")(emphasis added).
12. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
13. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts 76 (2004), available at www.abanet.org/litigation/vanishingtrial/vanishingtrial.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
14. Id. at 77.
15. Richard C. Reuben, The Closing Courthouse Door: When Arbitration Subverts Democracy by
Blocking Access to the Courts, Mandatory Arbitration and Separability Undermine the Rule of Law,
TRIAL, Jan. 2006, at 34-35.
16. Id. at 35 (citing AM. ARB. ASS'N, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2001); AM. ARB. AWSN, 2000
ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (2000)).
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trial is the mechanism by which our justice system employs the political institu-
tion, the jury. 17 Without trials, the jury is excluded from the adjudication process
and the function that the jury serves-the impartial administration of justice by a
representative body of society-is eliminated. 8 Further, trials provide a venue for
parties to represent their competing interest to impartial decisionmakers, the result
of which may be thoroughly reviewed.' 9 In other words, there is a strong public
interest in trials because that process ensures the proper resolution of issues that
may affect the public at large. Trials are also a source of information for inter-
ested parties, and are the mechanism by which legal doctrine is developed. 21 Pub-
lic adjudication of socially important controversies results in benchmarks which
assist in the settlement of future cases.
The factors recognized as contributing to the "vanishing trial" phenomenon
and the preference for mediation and settlement are clearly in direct contradiction
to the factors supporting the preference for adjudication. As will be discussed
below, those same competing interests have directly affected the outcome of cases
addressing the right of the public to access information pertaining to litigation and
the right of parties to have information deemed confidential.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS RIGHT TO ACCESS
Courts have generally acknowledged a common law right of access to judicial
proceedings and judicial records.22 The presumption of public access has been
applied "to a wide variety of civil records and documents, including papers filed
in connection with a motion for summary judgment," transcripts of trial and ex-
hibits admitted during trial, settlement documents and post-settlement motions
seeking to interpret and enforce agreements filed with the court, and transcripts of
hearings for preliminary injunctions. 23 Courts haves explained that the presump-
tion of a right to access serves several functions:
The public's exercise of its common law access right in civil cases pro-
motes public confidence in the judicial system. . . . As with other
branches of government, the bright light cast upon the judicial process by
public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompe-
tence, perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process
should provide the public with a more complete understanding of the ju-
dicial system and a better perception of its fairness. In addition, [aiccess
to civil proceedings and records promotes public respect for the judicial
17. Stephen Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973,974 (2004).
18. Id. at 974-76.
19. Id. at 976-78.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 978-79.
22. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780-81 (citing Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988)).
23. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Repub-
lic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660-62 (3d Cir. 1991); Littlejohn, 851
F.2d at 678-80; Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savs. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339
(3d Cir. 1986); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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process and helps to assure that judges perform their duties in an honest
and informed manner.
24
To overcome the presumption of the right to access the moving party must
demonstrate that the interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption.25 Because of
the liberality of pretrial discovery, federal courts have the inherent authority to
issue protective orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.26 Such
authority is necessary because of the "significant potential for abuse," which is not
limited solely to matters of delay and expense, but also to the potential to impli-
cate the privacy interest of litigants and third parties. 27 To obtain an order of pro-
tection over discovery materials, the moving party must demonstrate that "good
cause" exists for such an order.28 Good cause is established upon a "showing that
disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking
[dis]closure. ' ' z9 Even in the context of trade secrets, confidential research, devel-
opment, and other commercial information, courts have not automatically given
complete immunity against disclosure. 0 Instead, the moving party's claim of
privacy must be weighed against the need for disclosure.31 The confidentiality of
each document sought to be protected must be established3 2
In balancing the factors, the court must weigh the moving party's "need for
information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is com-
pelled. 33 If the court determines that disclosure is required, then it must next
determine whether the materials should be disclosed in a designated way or
whether disclosure should be limited3 4 Courts must take into account the interest
of privacy, but such interests are diminished when the person seeking protection is
a public person or the information sought concerns the health or safety of the pub-
lic.35 Conversely, if the moving party is a private litigant and the material in-
volved is of little legitimate public interest, then the interest of privacy weighs in
favor of granting a protective order.36 Moreover, the general interest of furthering
settlement cannot serve as the sole factor for granting a protective order and
should not be provided any weight unless there is a particularized showing for the
need of confidentiality in reaching a settlement.
3 7
24. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
25. Id. at 165
26. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34-35.
27. Id.
28. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) and Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199
(3d Cir. 1989)).
29. Id. at 786.
30. See Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 166.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427,433 (1991)).
34. Id. at 787 (citing Miller, supra note 33, at 433-35).
35. Id. at 787.
36. Id. at 787-88.
37. Id. at 788.
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These factors apply to motions for protective orders considered at all stages
of litigation, including settlements. 38 Thus, litigants must be aware of these fac-
tors because courts are no longer likely to permit blanket protective orders.
IJI. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits federal district courts to issue
protective orders "for good cause shown ... to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."3 9 The rule
sets forth that the court may enter an order to include one or more of the follow-
ing:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the dis-
closure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons des-
ignated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a desig-
nated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 4
As discussed, supra, there is no absolute privilege of confidentiality and the
rule requires the party seeking such an order to establish "good cause. ' '41 As ob-
served by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, it is apparent
that the opposite is true; therefore, discovery materials may be open for public
38. Id. at 786
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
40. Id.
41. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
No. 1]
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inspection when judicial protection is unwarranted because of a failure to establish
good cause.42
A party relying upon a protective order must be aware that the order can be
subject to modification. Federal courts have varied on how to address modifica-
tion. For instance, in determining whether to modify an existing protective order,
courts in the Third Circuit apply the balancing test outlined above in addition to
considering the original parties' reliance on the protective order.43 The reliance
factor is not a determinative factor because the parties are on notice that protective
orders may be modified.44 The extent to which a party can rely on a protective
order depends on the extent to which the protective order induced the party to
allow discovery or to settle the case.45 The Second Circuit, on the other hand,
requires a showing of improvidence in granting the protective order or of a com-
pelling need before modification can be justified. 46 Thus, the Second Circuit pro-
vides greater weight to the litigants' reliance upon the existing protective order.
In any event, third parties clearly have standing to challenge protective orders
and/or confidentiality agreements.47 There can be no guarantee that a protective
order will not be challenged, modified, or vacated during the course of litigation
or even years after. 8 A moving party can challenge a protective order by merely
establishing an "injury in fact., 49 The injury asserted is usually interference with
the right to access doctrine or a right provided by the Constitution, i.e., the First
Amendment, 50 or statute.5' The moving party need not demonstrate the likeliness
that he or she will prevail on the merits. 2 Accordingly, parties' seeking to keep
certain material out of the public's eye may have an incentive to choose a venue
other than the courtroom.
Recently, the Second Circuit clarified that in addition to the common law
right to access, the public and the press have a First Amendment right to attend
judicial proceedings and access certain judicial documents. 3 The court noted that
relevant documents that are submitted to a court in the course of adjudicatory
proceedings are subject to the presumption of public access.54 Once presented to
the court the documents are considered "judicial documents" regardless of which
party filed them or of the outcome of the proceeding.55  Judicial documents are
entitled to the highest presumption of public access.56 Accordingly, documents
42. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir. 1988).
43. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 229.
47. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777.
48. See generally Anita Hotchkiss & Diane M. Fleming, Protecting and Enforcing Protective Or-
ders: Easier Said Than Done, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 161 (2004).
49. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777.
50. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (holding that First Amendment
considerations and the common law right of acccss to judicial records apply to all judicial proceedings
and materials filed with the Court).
51. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777.
52. Id.
53. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 123.
[Vol. 2006
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used by parties moving for, or opposing, a substantive motion, such as one for
summary judgment, should not remain under seal "absent the most compelling
reasons."57 The Court explained: "If the rationale behind access is to allow the
public an opportunity to assess the correctness of the judge's decision ... docu-
ments that the judge should have considered or relied upon, but did not, are just as
deserving of disclosure as those that actually entered into the judge's decision. 5 8
This rationale applies regardless of the party's intent in seeking access to the pre-
viously sealed documents.
59
The Second Circuit's holding, which is consistent with previous rulings by
other District and Circuit Courts, 6° is an example of the increased burden litigants
may have in attempting to protect private interests. Indeed, the defendants in
Lugosch risked having their private information revealed when they filed a motion
for summary judgment attaching twenty-five sealed documents totaling approxi-
mately 4000 pages. In opposition, the plaintiff filed fifteen volumes of sealed
appendices, as well as a sealed memorandum of law, and a sealed response to
defendants' statement of material facts.61 Newspaper companies filed motions to
intervene to obtain access to the filed documents, which the district court held in
abeyance pending the outcome of the motion for summary judgment.62 The Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the motion could not be held in abeyance because the
"contested documents are judicial documents to which a presumption of immedi-
ate access applies under both the common law and the First Amendment."63 The
Second Circuit remanded the matter for a determination of whether the presump-
tion is overcome by countervailing factors, 64 but the opinion reveals the risk to
defendants in filing sealed documents in support of their motion.
Technology has compounded the risk as electronic filing becomes mandatory
by courts that have yet to discover an efficient method to protect private interests.
The protection of those interests may require the court to reconsider the weight
provided to certain factors in balancing the right to access versus confidentiality.
IV. ELECTRONIC FILING
Prior to electronic filing, routine review of court records was uncommon.
Generally, the litigants, interested persons, and the press were the only individuals
or entities that would rummage through copies of documents that were on file
57. Id. (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982)).
58. Id. (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101
F.R.D. 34, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
59. Id.
60. See FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987); Joy, 692 F.2d at 880;
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1991); Publicker, 733
F.2d at 1059; Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d
1568 (11 th Cir. 1985).
61. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 113-14.
62. Id. at 114.
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with the court clerk.65 Today, with the advent of electronic filing, the public at
large can collect a vast amount of personal and private information regarding a
case with the click of a mouse.66 Access to such information can have a substan-
tial impact on the privacy concerns of litigants and those individuals named in a
court document. Personal and sometimes embarrassing information will now be
readily accessible and businesses now have to worry about their commercial and
private documents.
A concern with a process called "data mining" was discussed at the recent
Sedona Conference regarding protective orders, confidentiality, and public access
held last September 8, 2005 at Seton Hall School of Law. Mary Sue Henifin and
Robert J. Levin argued that electronic filing may now permit businesses to "data
mine" court dockets and search for cases involving their competitors. 67 The po-
tential for abuse is unlimited as electronic filing may "turn court records into a
massive data bank" that can be accessible to the world instantaneously upon fil-
ing.68 This potential for abuse, clearly impacts the balance of factors concerning
the right to access and confidentiality. 69 The idea of grueling searches through
archives will become extinct and new measures will have to be developed to pro-
tect privacy interests.7 ° Until the courts are able to find an effective balance
and/or method to protect privacy interests, litigants will be more reluctant than
ever to file information that they know will become readily accessible. 71 Courts
must acknowledge that the development of the common law right and First
Amendment right to access did not take into account the technological advances
that have occurred; thus, the balancing of this new technological factor must be
addressed in order to address what will likely contribute to the "vanishing trial."
V. NEW JERSEY LOCAL FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 5.3
As an example of the judiciary's failure to address the side effects of elec-
tronic filing, consider the consequences with New Jersey's new Local Federal
Rule 5.3. The rule was recently adopted on February 24, 2005, and addresses the
sealing of discovery materials, materials associated with judicial proceedings, and
provides public notice of all requests to seal. The rule permits parties to enter into
written agreements to keep materials produced through discovery confidential. In
addition, the rule addresses the treatment of settlement agreements. However,
subsection (c)(1) of the rule requires that any request to "seal, or otherwise restrict
public access to, any materials or judicial proceedings shall be made by formal
65. George F. Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience Under
Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule's Future in a World of Electronic Filing, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1089,
1089 (2003).
66. See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, "Mind Your Own Business!": Making the Case For the Implications
of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 4
(2003).
67. Mary Sue Henifin & Robert J. Levin, A Business Perspective on Local Rule 5.3 & the Sedona
Guidelines on Best Practices for Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public Access, Sedona Confer-
ence (2005).
68. Carpinello, supra note 65, at 1121.
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motion... [and] shall be filed electronically under the designation 'motion to seal
materials' or 'motion to seal judicial proceedings."' Subsection (c)(2) lists spe-
cific factors that the motion papers must address in regard to confidentiality.
Those factors are consistent with the factors outlined in Pansy.72
A literal reading of the rule suggests that "at the moment a motion to seal is
denied, confidential documents submitted in connection with that motion auto-
matically and immediately be converted to public status. 73 The rule appropri-
ately abides by the presumption of the right of access, but makes no concessions
for the fact that materials deemed private by the litigant will be readily accessible
by the public at large if ruled not to overcome the presumption. The failure to
make such a concession or to address the reality of the litigants' concerns may add
to a litigant's reluctance to proceed through the courts. The efficiency of elec-
tronic filing should not be permitted to contribute to the "vanishing trial." Other
methods should certainly be utilized to address litigants' concerns, including per-
mission to file hard copies when such concerns exist. Such an option takes into
consideration the accessibility of the information sought to be protected while
permitting interested parties to gain access.
Courts need to consider limiting access to such documents by permitting the
burden to shift when the party protecting such information establishes that the
seeking party has no legitimate interest in the information. Such a burden shift
would prevent competitors from accessing confidential information for the sole
purpose of gaining an upper hand. By preventing access to those parties that have
an interest that is inconsistent with the public policy reasons set forth in favor of
the right to access, the policy remains effective. Requiring the seeking party to
explain the purpose of its inquiry, when the purpose has been questioned, is not
inconsistent with promoting the court's perception of fairness. The court's deci-
sion to deny access should be reviewable and open to the public scrutiny. In addi-
tion, such a requirement promotes fairness to the litigants utilizing the courts,
takes into consideration the change in time, and in the long run will help to ad-
dress the "vanishing trial" phenomenon.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the advent of electronic filing, our court system is able to utilize tech-
nology to make the system more efficient; but, as with most substantial changes,
new concerns need to be addressed. Scholars have identified the "vanishing trial"
phenomenon, its potential causes, and the affect it may have or is having on our
judicial system. The concerns associated with electronic filing may add to the
causes of the "vanishing trial," if they are not addressed. Litigants with an interest
in keeping certain discoverable material confidential are less likely to participate
in a judicial process if there is a potential risk that the court may make the confi-
dential information easily accessible to the public. Courts need to consider the
policy reasons associated with the right to access and consider as a new factor to
the balancing test the concerns of the litigant in regard to electronic filing. The
failure to do so may further reduce the utilization of the court system. While utili-
72. Cf. N.J. Rule X with Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786-91.
73. ALLYN Z. LITE, NEW JERSEY FEDERAL PRACTICE RULEs, (2006) (cm.4 on R. 5.3).
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